![]() The destruction of a political apparatus’ source of physical power, its army, directly influenced the political will of both – the destroyer and the destroyed – resulting in battle driving political decisions. This phenomenon resulted in a relatively self-contained, mechanistic system, where policy, strategy, and battlefield results constitute three parts of a whole and each component had a reciprocal effect on the others. This physical arrangement between national policy, military strategy, and the tactical situation created the condition in which the physical destruction of an army had a direct impact on political will. The physical proximity of the policy maker(s) to the battlefield created a unique phenomenon in which the purveyor of policy was physically able to see, smell, and hear the effects of battle. During the battle Napoleon III, the emperor of France, and Victor Emmanuel, the king of Sardinia, led their armies against the Austrian army, under the command of Franz Joseph I. Most notably, Austrian Archduke Charles leading the Austrian forces in Northern Italy, Ferdinand IV (king of Naples and Sicily) leading coalition forces into Bavaria, and Archduke John leading Austrian forces in Tyrol. The last recorded instance of the heads of state physically leading their armies into battle was the battle of Solferino, from the Second War of Italian Independence, which occurred on June 24, 1859. However, the lesser heads of state very often led formations in battle – the Ulm-Austerlitz Campaign finds several archdukes and princes leading formations on the battlefield. Finding the COG Context: The Character of 19th Century WarfareĬlausewitz wrote On War drawing largely upon his experiences during the Napoleonic Wars and the philosophic-dialectical approach of German philosophers Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel, while to a lesser degree pulling from the historical lessons of Frederick the Great’s campaigns. Clausewitz’s combat experience included fighting against Napoleon Bonaparte during the War of the Third and Fourth Coalitions and later in the service of the Russian army during Napoleon’s 1812 campaign into Russia.Ī defining feature of the Napoleonic Wars was that heads of state (i.e., kings, dukes, archdukes, princes, etc.) often joined their armies on the battlefield. While present, most other heads of state did not physically lead their armies in battle like Bonaparte, but they were not far from the front. As a result, doctrine must break with an anachronistic application of a metaphor suited for 18th and 19th century warfare, and instead address the realities of contemporary and future warfare by replacing the COG with a systems approach that accounts for an adversarial system's ability to sense, adapt, and act. In doing so, doctrine will become more responsive to the fleeting opportunities in warfare, resulting in a more meaningful use of force. ![]() Doctrine, rooted in a linear, Jominian application of Clausewitz’s COG concept, lacks the agility – cognitive and physical – to match the dynamism of contemporary systems warfare. Modern systems sense, adapt, and act, while simultaneously hiding and protecting their critical vulnerabilities and operating for self-perpetuation. Modern warfare is embodied by the collision of opposing systems in pursuit of political objectives. The center of gravity (COG) – a metaphor to define warfare between relatively closed systems – has been rendered ineffective in modern warfare. One of Clausewitz’s more controversial concepts, the center of gravity, falls into this category. This is certainly not to say On War or Clausewitzian theory no longer carry value, but instead suggests some of the concepts therein need to be reexamined in relation to the passing of time. As a result, some of the ideas and metaphors Clausewitz used to describe his understanding of war and warfare might have outlived their utility. ![]() As many historians like to point out, 19th century Prussian military theorist and army officer Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780-1831) seminal work, On War, was not written to be a “how-to” manual about waging warfare, but instead as a timeless treatise on the nature of war. Yet, Clausewitz was a product of both his time and experience.
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